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WHAT O'CLOCK I SAY: JURIDICAL EPISTEMICS AND THE
MAGISTERIUM OF THE CHURCH
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. t
Petruchio: I will not go today; and ere I do
It shall be what o'clock I say it is.
Hortensio: Why, so, this gallant will command the sun.'
Scrope, CJ.: I remember it well, but I can have no
knowledge of it in my capacity as judge.2
The Catholic Church claims a wide authority to make
pronouncements on faith and morals, and have them respected
by members of the church. The nature and extent of the respect
to be accorded them is subject to considerable debate, some of it
both extensive and acrimonious. It is claimed, to be sure, that
certain pronouncements are infallible; if so, they are obviously
beyond debate. But for most pronouncements no such claim is
made. Furthermore, the question whether a given pronounce-
ment is infallible or not is itself debatable, and can generally not
be infallibly resolved.
We are confronted, therefore, with an array of assertions of
varying provenance to which we are expected to give some
measure of credence, even though we have no guarantee that
they are true, or even that their authors are particularly well-
informed. They take their authority from that of the church,
which in its corporate capacity is the repository of God's
Revelation, and the beneficiary of His guidance.
t Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Legal Ethics, Notre Dame
Law School.
1. The Taming of the Shrew, Act IV, Scene 3.
2. Eyre of Northamptonshire 1329-1330 at 238 i (Selden Soc. xcvii). An ex-sheriff, accused
of allowing a prisoner to escape, has reminded Scrope that he was previously cleared of
the same charge before Scrope himself in the King's Bench. But personal recollection
will not serve for an acquittal in the Eyre. The accused must go to Westminster and get
the record from the King's Bench. Compare St. Thomas Aquinas's argument in S. Theol.,
II, II, q. 64, article 6 that a judge must condemn an accused to death if the evidence
indicates that he is guilty, even if the judge has personal knowledge that he is innocent.
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The prelates, officials, and church bodies that exercise this
authority necessarily do so under legal forms. Divinely guided or
not, the church is an institution, and it is legal form that
determines whether and in what way the words and deeds of
natural persons are to be attributed to an institution. It is
unfortunate, therefore, that the ongoing debate over the force
and effect of the church's doctrinal pronouncements has elicited
so little analysis of their legal form. Analogous pronouncements
of secular authorities have been analyzed more fully. They are
dealt with by legal scholars under a range of titles including
Agency, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Corporations,
and sometimes even Torts and Criminal Law. My object in this
article is to locate the pronouncements of the church on faith and
morals in the context provided by this legal material, and see
what light that context can shed on them.
THREE KINDS OF PRONOUNCEMENT
It might seem at first blush that no comparison is possible:
the state does not make doctrinal pronouncements as the church
does. On the other hand, the state does come up with
pronouncements which, like those of the church, determine that
such-and-such is--or is deemed to be-the case, and that
particular affairs shall be dealt with accordingly. These are far
from a majority of legal enactments, but there are enough of
them to provide the material for a comparative analysis.
Factual pronouncements in the law come in three distinct
categories, different in provenance, in purpose, and in effect. I
will call them epistemic, normative, and constitutive. Epistemic
pronouncements call for acting on the basis of something being
the case because of good faith investigation and determination
that it is in fact the case. The findings of fact in a judicial decision
or in the preamble of a statute are of this kind.3 Normative
pronouncements seek to accomplish their purpose by treating
something as being the case whether it is so or not. Estoppels,
3. If a fact is specifically found by a court or jury after a trial, the parties to the
litigation are generally precluded from asserting in another litigation that that fact is not
the case. Findings of fact in the preamble of a statute are used by courts either to
interpret the statute or to uphold its validity. A famous example is Block v Hirsch, 256 US
135, 194 (1921), in which a finding by Congress as to the effect of the First World War on
housing in the District of Columbia was used to uphold rent regulation that the Court as
it was then constituted would otherwise have invalidated.
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irrebuttable presumptions, and constructive trusts are examples.4
Constitutive pronouncements actually cause something to be the
case-some state of affairs defined by the law. The county line,
for instance, is always wherever the legislature says it is. Or, if the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
Smith a judge, it will immediately be the case that Smith is a
judge.
It is possible for a pronouncement to be effective in one of
these categories when it would be impossible or illegal in either
of the others. Here are three examples, one from each category:
Epistemic:
During the First World War, a German submarine sank a
plainly marked British hospital ship. After the war, the captain
was put on trial. His defense was that the German Admiralty had
informed him that the British were marking their troopships as
hospital ships, and therefore he should not regard ships marked
in this way as immune from attack. This defense was held good.5
While the captain had no right to sink hospital ships on superior
orders, he was entitled to believe his superiors regarding a matter
of empirical fact that he had no way of verifying. In other words,
while the Admiralty had no normative authority-they could not
order the sinking of a hospital ship-and no constitutive
authority-they could not make a hospital ship into a legitimate
target-they did have epistemic authority. Submarine
commanders could give their pronouncements epistemic effect.
Normative:
From May through December, 1862, General Benjamin
Butler was in command of the federal troops occupying New
Orleans. The population were generally hostile, and the women
took particular pains to show their hostility. To deal with the
situation, Butler issued the following order:
4. The usual estoppel occurs when A is so far responsible for a factual error on B's
part as to be precluded from asserting the true fact against B. A presumption is a fact
that requires no evidence to establish it. If evidence to the contrary will be received and
considered, the presumption is rebuttable; if not, it is irrebuttable or conclusive. A
constructive trust arises when A has acquired property from B by fraud or duress, and is
therefore made to treat it as if he were B's trustee.
5. The Dover Castle, 16AmJ ofIntl L 704 (1921).
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Whenever any female shall, by word, or gesture, or
movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or
soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held
liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her
avocation.6
This order was purely normative. Butler had-or claimed to
have-authority to control the behavior of the local populace
toward his troops, and his order was adopted as a way of doing
so. He claimed no epistemic authority: no authority to investigate
and. adjudge whether a particular woman was or was not a
prostitute. And he certainly did not claim to make any woman a
prostitute who was not one already.
Constitutive:
During the Second World War, Congress passed an act
calling for all clocks to be set ahead an hour so as to provide
additional light for the war effort. A certain bar in Wisconsin
remained open until 2 A.M. Central War Time, and the proprietor
was prosecuted for violating a state statute requiring such bars to
close at one. He defended himself on the basis of other state
statutes, enacted before the war; according to those statutes, it
was one o'clock when he closed. But the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin said that the object of all laws setting time is
uniformity, and it cannot be supposed that the Wisconsin
legislature intended to have state and federal affairs run on
different times.7  The law involved in this case is clearly
constitutive. Federal time statutes do contain provisions that
federal agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce
shall govern themselves accordingly, but Congress had neither
the authority nor the inclination to tell bars in Wisconsin when to
close. The law cannot be normative, because it has effect beyond
the normative reach of the power that enacted it. Nor is it
epistemic. "Real" time is sun time. It varies by four minutes with
each degree of longitude, and changes incrementally with every
step you take east or west. Anyone with a sun dial can make a
better epistemic determination of real time than any legislature
can. The custom of "standard" time, changing in one hour
6. Virtually all Civil War histories tell this story, as does Butler's entry in the
Dictionary ofAnweican Biography, Vol. I Part I at 357 (Scribner, 1957).
7. State v Badolati, 241 Wis 496, 6 NW2d 220, 143 ALR 1234 (1942).
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increments with every fifteen degrees of longitude, was first
adopted by railroads in 1883, and then taken up by state statutes,
and'finally by a federal statute in 1918.8 The evolution in other
countries was similar. In every place, therefore, the time in legal
effect is chosen, not discerned.
Particular agencies, as shown in these examples, may have a
broader authority over one category of pronouncement than over
the, others. But a legal system taken as a whole will have all three
categories available, and will give them different kinds of work to
do.
Constitutive forms are generally used for delegation of
authority, assignment of personal status, and formalization of
transactions. I referred to the drawing of boundaries between
political subdivisions and to the appointment of judges. A law
enumerating the powers of an administrative agency would be
another example. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution are examples of assigning status,
freedom in the one case, citizenship in the other. Examples
involving transactions include the Statute of Frauds,9 the
requirement of two witnesses for a will, the rule that minors are
not bound by their contracts, and the requirement of licenses for
marriages. The significant characteristic of a constitutive
pronouncement is that it is self-executing. When the legislature
says that you cannot marry without a license, it is in fact the case
that you cannot marry without a license. You can go through the
ceremony, but you will not be married. On the other hand, when
the legislature says that you cannot drive a car without a license,
that is not in fact the case. If you drive without a license you may
get arrested,, but until you are caught you can still drive.
Normative pronouncements are used where the law
embraces some value that calls for acting as if something is the
case whether or not it is in fact so. They cover a wide range of
concerns, from the provision in Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for treating issues not raised by the pleadings as if
they were so raised to the traditional rule of family law that
presumes a woman's husband to be the father of her child. In the
one case, the law implements a policy of not letting litigations be
lost on pleading errors, in the other a policy of promoting family
8. Ann, 143 ALR 1238 (1943).
9. The Statute of Frauds makes certain classes of oral contracts unenforceable.
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stability. As Justice Scalia put it in the latter case: "Of course the
conclusive presumption not only expresses the state's policy but
also furthers it, excluding inquires into the child's paternity that
would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.' '10
Epistemic pronouncements arise from a genuine purpose of
ascertaining the truth and acting accordingly, but without unduly
straining the resources of the legal system for informing itself.
Res judicata and administrative finality are examples.' So are
most rebuttable presumptions. While most conclusive or
irrebuttable presumptions are normative, a few of these are
epistemic also. They are used where the fact presumed is so
likely to be the case that drawing it into question will make more
trouble than it is worth. The most common example is the
statutory presumption that certain family members are dependent
on a wage earner for support."l Such presumptions are more
questionable now than they were a generation back, and some of
them have been declared unconstitutional. In 1977, for instance,
the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Social Security
Act that gave benefits automatically to widows, but gave them to
widowers only on a showing of actual dependency." Four
justices thought that widows were so often dependent and
widowers so seldom that the distinction was empirically justified,
but the other five found it to be an impermissible gender
discrimination.
CASE ANALYSIS
Often, the three categories are intertwined or ambiguous, so
that they have to be sorted out or characterized before a case can
be decided. For example, the federal legislation regarding loss of
citizenship has at one time or another embraced all three of our
categories, and it has taken several decisions of the Supreme
Court to give each its proper scope. Until 1958, the applicable
provisions were partly constitutive and partly normative. 4 The
10. Micbael. vGeraldD., 491 US 110, 120 (1989).
11. Res judicata is a doctrine that precludes relitigating a matter once decided by a
court. Administrative finality does the same for a matter decided by an administrative
agency.
12. See, for instance, the Ind Workers' Compensation Act, Ind Code 22-3-3-19; Wilson
vfLaPorteGas&ElectricCompany, 107 Ind App 21, 22 NE2d 882 (1939).
13. Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US 99 (1977).
14. 8 US Code 1481. The provision on voting was repealed in 1978.
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constitutive part made loss of citizenship follow automatically
from certain acts such as enlisting in a foreign army or voting in a
foreign election. The normative part made loss of citizenship part
of the punishment to be imposed by a court martial on a wartime
deserter. In 1958, the constitutive part was upheld against
constitutional objection in Perez v. Brownell,1 while the normative
part was stricken down in Trop v. Dulles. 6
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority in Perez, said
that dual nationality was a source of conflict with other nations,
and Congress, in the exercise of its power over foreign relations,
could adopt this measure to deal with the problem. The
constitutive provision took effect automatically when the problem
arose, and afforded a built-in solution. Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas both wrote dissenting opinions to the effect that
the Fourteenth Amendment, by making citizens of "all persons
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof," deprived Congress of any power to take
away the citizenship of anyone who did not choose deliberately
to relinquish it. Douglas is particularly clear on the constitutive
character of the amendment: "We deal here with the right of
citizenship created by the Constitution .... What the
Constitution grants the Constitution can take away. But there is
not a word in that document that covers expatriation."17
The normative provision in Trop, unlike the constitutive
provision in Perez, had no built-in relation to the situation it
addressed. It treated the act of desertion as an abandonment of
national allegiance even if in fact it was nothing of the kind. As
Warren put it in his plurality opinion:
The purpose of taking away citizenship from a convicted
deserter is simply to punish him. There is no other
legitimate purpose that the statute could serve.
Denationalization in this case is not even claimed to be a
means of solving international problems, as was argued in
Perez.18
Having determined that the expatriation was a punishment,
Warren found that it was a cruel and unusual one forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment. Frankfurter, dissenting, found the
15. PerezvBrownell, 356 US 44 (1958).
16. TropvDules, 356 US 86 (1958).
17. Perez, 356 Us at 79.
18. Trop, 356 US at 97.
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provision to be a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress to
wage war, and therefore not to constitute punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.1 9
Justice Brennan, the only justice in the majority in both
cases, relied a good deal on the constitutive character of the
expatriation in Perez versus the normative character of that in Trop.
On the one hand, under the constitutive provision:
Expatriation ... has the advantage of acting automatically,
for the very act of casting the ballot is the act of
denationalization, which could have the effect of cutting off.
responsibility for the consequences. If a foreign government
objects, the answer should be conclusive-the voter is no
longer one of ours. Harsh as the consequences may be to
the individual concerned, Congress has ordained the loss of
citizenship simultaneously with the act of voting because
Congress might reasonably believe that in these
circumstances there is no acceptable alternative to
expatriation as a means of avoiding possible
embarrassments to our relations with foreign nations.2 °
On the other hand, under the normative provision:
It is difficult, indeed, to see how expatriation of the deserter
helps wage war except as it performs that function when
imposed as a punishment. It is obvious that expatriation
cannot in any wise avoid the harm apprehended by
Congress. After the act of desertion, only punishment can
follow, for the harm has been done. The deserter,
moreover, does not cease to be an American citizen at the
moment he deserts. Indeed, even conviction does not
necessarily effect his expatriation, for dishonorable
discharge is the condition precedent to loss of citizenship.
Therefore, if expatriation is made a consequence of.,
desertion, it. must stand together with death and
imprisonment-as a form of punishment.2 1
Having drawn this distinction, Brennan relied on the general
unreasonableness of the normative provision, rather than on the
Eighth Amendment, to invalidate it.
In Afroyim v. Rusk (1967),22 the Court overruled Perez, relying
for the most part on the constitutive force of the Fourteenth
19. Id at 114.
20. Id at 105, 106.
21. Id at 105, 109-10.
22. AfroyimvRusk, 387 US 253 (1967).
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Amendment as Warren and Douglas had interpreted it in their
dissenting opinions. Since the Amendment says that anyone is a
citizen who is born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, no one can be denationalized except
by a voluntary act. This decision invalidated the whole statutory
list of denationalizing actions insofar as it purported to have
either constitutive or normative effect. But the list appears still to
have epistemic effect. The listed actions can be taken as evidence
of the voluntary relinquishment that is the only way a person
once a citizen can cease to be one after Afroyim. How much
evidentiary effect such actions have is in some debate in the cases,
but the Supreme Court has held that they may be considered
"highly persuasive," and that Congress may adjust the burden of
proof regarding them without infringing on substantive rights.23
In short, according to the Court, Congress has more authority to
address this subject with epistemic effect than with either
constitutive or normative effect.
In other cases, a legislative body may have normative power
where it would not have epistemic. This is the upshot of a short
opinion by justice Holmes in the case of Ferry v. Ramsey (1928).24 A
Kansas statute provided that bank directors would be personally
liable if they allowed their bank to accept deposits when they
knew it was insolvent, and that if their bank was in fact insolvent
they would be presumed to know. A director attacked this statute
as violating due process by presuming something (i.e.,
knowledge) to be the case on thie basis of an inference that had
no support in reality. Holmes brushed this objection aside,
saying that the state could if it chose make directors liable
regardless of knowledge. It followed that by requiring knowledge
and then presuming it the state was being less strict than it
needed to be, and the director had no ground for complaint. In
other words, the statute, though epistemically infirm, could be
sustained as an exercise of normative authority.
Feny, like a number of Holmes decisions, proved not to be
subtle enough for the long haul. In Tot v. United States (1943),25 the
Supreme Court invalidated a federal, statute making it a crime for
a convicted felon to have a gun that had been shipped in
interstate commerce since the enactment of the statute, and
23. Vance v Terrazas, 444 US 252 (1980).
24. Ferry vRamsey, 277 US 88 (1928).
25. Totv United States, 319 US 463 1519 (1943).
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creating a presumption that any gun found in the possession of a
convicted felon had been so shipped. The Court accepted the
argument that an inference with no empirical basis violated due
process, but refused to do what Holmes had done and allow the
epistemic weakness to be made up for normatively. Granted,
Congress might have made it a crime for a convicted felon to have
any gun at all, but that is not what they chose to do. This statute,
like the one in Ferry, failed epistemically where it might have
succeeded normatively. But this Court, unlike the Ferry Court,
would not shift the statute from one category to the other in
order to save it.
In administrative law, the distinction between the normative
and the epistemic affects the handling of what are called mixed
questions of law and fact. Obviously, a proposition that such and
such is the case can be either one of law or one of fact. I have
tried to show here that it can also be either epistemic or
normative. In many cases, it is the latter distinction that
structures the debate over the finality to be accorded
determinations by administrators, or the extent to which such
determinations are reviewable in court. A classic case on the
subject is NLRB v. Hearst Publications,26 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1944. The issue was whether certain news vendors were
"employees" of the publishers whose papers they sold, and, as
such, entitled to collective bargaining under federal law. The
National Labor Relations Board had decided that they were, and
the reviewing court had decided the opposite. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court and upheld the Board.
There was available at the time a great body of precedent on
the subject of who is or is not an "employee," but most of it
involved vicarious liability-that is, the application of the
principle that an employer is liable for the torts of an employee,
but not for those of an "independent contractor." It was
reasonably clear that under these precedents the news vendors
would have been independent contractors. Had one of them
negligently placed a stack of newspapers where a passerby would
trip over them, the publisher would not have been liable. The
Board did not deny that that was the case, but they decided that
the word "employee" in the statute they were given to administer
should be interpreted as referring not to such workers as would
26. NLRB vHearstPublications, 322 US 111 (1944).
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be sources of tort liability, but to such workers as needed the
protection the statute provided. Justice Rutledge, speaking for all
but one of his colleagues, agreed with the Board's approach:
Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made
exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's
purposes, it cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers
in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to
the evils the statute was designed to eradicate ....27
And the determination of what workers are subject to the evils in
question, and therefore to be regarded as employees for
purposes of the Labor Relations Act, is committed by statute to
the discretion of the Board.
Rutledge's decision treats the question of whether it is the
case that the news vendors are employees as a normative one. It
is to be answered in accordance with whether an affirmative
answer will implement legislative policy. The answer is up to the
Board because the task of implementing this particular piece of
legislative policy is assigned by statute to the Board. The
normative character of the decision as Rutledge sees it is
emphasized by the epistemic character that Justice Roberts in his
dissenting opinion says that the decision ought to have:
I think it plain that newsboys are not "employees" of the
respondents within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act. When Congress ... said "The term
'employee' shall include any employee, . . ." it stated as
clearly as language could do it that the provisions of the Act
were to extend to those who, as a result of decades of
tradition which had become part of the common
understanding of our people, bear the named relationship.2"
In Hearst, the authority to make the decision was assigned to
the agency because it was normative whereas if it had been
epistemic it would have been assigned to the court. In other
cases, the opposite assignment is made. O'Keefe v. Smith, Hinchman &
Grylls (1965)29 involved a man who drowned in a recreational
weekend boating accident while he was in Korea doing a job for a
United States government contractor. The Deputy Commissioner
administering the federal compensation law awarded a death
benefit to the man's family on the theory that his death was job
27. Id at 127.
28. Idat 135.
29. OKeefe v Smith, Hincbman and GryllsAssoc, Inc., 380 US 359 (1965).
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related. The Deputy Commissioner's reasoning is not explained
at length in the report, but he presumably felt that anything that
happened to an overseas employee from the time he left the
United States until the time he returned was connected with the
job. A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the decision, simply
on the ground that it represented a rational inference from the
undisputed facts: "The rule of judicial review has therefore
emerged that the inferences drawn by the Deputy Commissioner
are to be accepted unless they are irrational or "unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record ... as a whole-"30  This
language points up the epistemic character of the Deputy
Commissioner's determination by referring to it as an inference.
The dissent regarded the same determination as normative,
and therefore objectionable because it exceeded the normative
authority of the Deputy Commissioner:
The cases in which this limited review of the administrator's
decision is appropriate are those in which one application of
the statute to the external facts of the case effectuates the
judicially recognizable purposes of the statute as well as
another .. .. In the case before us, the Deputy
Commissioner's ruling is not consistent with the statutory
purpose.
3 1
My point is not that the characterization determined the
result; it did not. The majority could have found that calling
weekend recreation job related was irrational and therefore
outside the epistemic authority of the Deputy Commissioner.
Conversely,. the dissenters could have found that full-time
coverage for overseas workers was within the normative authority
of the Deputy Commissioner because it could reasonably be
regarded as effectuating the purposes of the compensation law.
My point is simply that the characterization one way or the other
structured the debate, and will generally do so in cases of this
kind.
Hearst and O'Keefe both involve administrative adjudication.
Administrative agencies have also a rule-making function--one
which some possess more broadly or exercise more vigorously
than others. Rules, like statutes, are generally made on the basis
of extensive investigation of the relevant facts; even so, they are
30. Id at 362.
31. Id at 365, 368-69.
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generally considered normative in their effects. Within the factual
situation developed, the agency has policies to implement and
choices to make in implementing them. The decisions arrived at
are chosen, not discerned. But in one case, Heckler v. Campbell
(1983),32 the Supreme Court upheld a piece of rule-making with
purely epistemic effect.
The Social Security Act provides pensions for disabled
workers. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is
instructed to find that workers are disabled only if, considering
their age, education, and work experience, as well as their level of
disability, there is no work in the national economy that they can
do. In other words, the national economy may have jobs for
paraplegic lawyers, but not for paraplegic illiterates. As the
Secretary saw it, she or her subordinates had two decisions to
make, one regarding the individual claimant, the other regarding
the state of the national economy. The first was necessarily case-
specific,, but the second would be the same in every case.
Accordingly, she developed and promulgated by regulation a set
of guidelines to be used in all cases to determine what kind of
work existed in the national economy. Campbell, the claimant in
this case, argued that the Secretary should be required to bring
forward her assertions about the national economy in a case-
specific form, so that contrary evidence could be introduced by
the claimant and considered by the Administrative Law Judge in
each case. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that since the
same national economy is involved in every case, a single
regulation, made after a single investigation and consideration of
evidence, has as much assurance of epistemic accuracy as is
required. This is the clearest example I know of a strictly
legislative disposition with purely epistemic effect. As such, it
comes closest to some of the ecclesiastical material we are about
to consider.
PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION
Before turning to the church, though, let us look at a few
principles that apply to the secular material we have been
considering, and may, with a few qualifications, apply to the
church as well. One such principle is general: If there has been
an authoritative pronouncement to the effect that such and such
32. Hecklerv Campbell, 461 US 458 (1983).
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is (or will be deemed to be) the case, then affairs subject to the
authority making the pronouncement will be conducted on that
assumption. Other principles depend on which of the three
categories that we have been considering applies to a given
pronouncement.
Let us look first at the binding force of the different
pronouncements, the obligations they impose. There is a
general, albeit limited, moral obligation to obey the law, and
normative pronouncements invoke that obligation. They also
invoke the general principle that sanctions will be imposed on
those who do not obey. In fact, in many cases, the state of affairs
recognized by the pronouncement is itself a sanction, as in
General Butler's "woman of the town" order.
Constitutive pronouncements, as we have seen, are self-
executing. If they are unconditional-as with a drawing of
boundaries or an adoption of standard time-the only obligation
they impose is whatever obligation arises from the state of affairs
they announce-as in the case of the proprietor's duty to close
his bar at one. On the other hand, conditional constitutive
pronouncements, such as the provision that anyone who votes in
a foreign election ceases to be an American citizen, may never be
effective because it may never be known who fulfills the
condition. Just after the Second World War, Americans living in
certain foreign countries where they were eligible to vote because
of their national origins were encouraged to do so in order to
insure governments favorable to American policy. All of them
became aliens, and remained so until the Afroyim case restored
their citizenship,33 but many of them were quite unaware of either
transition.
For people who are directly subject to the author of an
epistemic pronouncement, it has about the same binding force as
a normative pronouncement would. If the relevant agencies find
that your airplane is unsafe, you will not be allowed to fly it; if
they find that your food additive causes cancer, you will not be
allowed to sell it. But beyond these normative effects, you may
give the epistemic pronouncement further effect if you believe
the author to be well informed. The finding that an airplane or a
food additive is safe may not require you to fly in the one or eat
the other, but it may lead you to feel safe in doing so. Also, as in
33. Ann, 2 LEd2d 1917 (1958).
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the case of the submarine captain, good faith reliance on an
authoritative epistemic determination may justify actions which
on the true facts would be unlawful, immoral, or both.
The excuses available for noncompliance also differ among the
three categories. Normative pronouncements are subject to the
same excuses as other norms. I would presume, for instance, that
Butler's order would not have been applied to a woman who
insulted a Union soldier in response to an indecent proposal by
the soldier.
In the case of a constitutive pronouncement, it is hard to
think of excuses for noncompliance, because it is hard to see
compliance as a meaningful concept. The authoritative statement
that such and such is the case in fact causes it to be the case. One
can be unaware of its being the case, just as one can be unaware
of any other fact, and that unawareness may have legal
consequences. But it would be stretching a point to speak of not
complying with the law that made it a fact.
Nor is it altogether accurate to speak of not complying with
an epistemic pronouncement. The fact declared by such a
pronouncement, like any other fact, may be subject to estoppel;
i.e., for some reason the law may forbid a person to take
advantage of its being the case. More important, it is possible for
an epistemic pronouncement, unlike the others, to be erroneous:
what it says to be true may in fact be false. If the error is clear
enough, it may justify disregarding the pronouncement. You can
probably avoid treating something as true if you have strong
enough evidence that it is false. On the other hand, officials do
not readily accept the possibility of being in error: the evidentiary
requirements may be substantial.
Opposition to constitutive or normative pronouncements is
generally political. Whether by electioneering, protest marches,
or throwing rotten tomatoes, if we wish to avoid a constitutive
pronouncement, we must get it repealed, and if we wish to avoid
a normative pronouncement,.we must at least get it not enforced.
But in the case of an epistemic pronouncement, we must show
that it is not the case. Political action may lead to the election or
appointment of authorities more open to that possibility than
their predecessors were, but the actual epistemic determination
cannot be political.
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PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE CHURCH
The church has constitutive and normative authority over the
sacraments, the liturgy, the deployment of its clergy and other
personnel, the administration of its property and revenues, and
the religious practices of its members. It also has epistemic
authority over questions of faith and morals. The first two
categories are rather like comparable secular authority, although
there are one or two peculiarities, as we shall see. The epistemic
authority of the church is also similar in many ways to its secular
analogue, but it is broader both in scope and in significance.
Because of its mandate to teach morality, the church has an
epistemic authority in many areas to which the authority of
secular law extends only normatively or not at all. The
proposition that the use of contraceptives is morally unacceptable
may be true or may be false.34 Church officials who try to
determine whether it is true or false and then let us know are
doing no more than their job. But they would not be doing their
job if, having decided that the practice is not morally
unacceptable, they told us to abstain from it anyway. Their
epistemic authority may extend to the marital bedroom, but their
normative authority does not.
Also, the epistemic authority of the church extends beyond
the realm of doing and not doing (as the theologians say, of
praxis). While we are told that faith without works is dead, works
without faith are not much recommended either. The church,
unlike the state, has a substantial set of epistemic
pronouncements that we are not expected immediately to act on,
but simply to believe. Believing them is not without practical
consequences, as we eventually learn, but the consequences are
not necessarily present to us when we accept the
pronouncements.3
34. Note how that proposition differs in form from other things that might be said on
the subject. "Don't use contraceptives" would be normative, but it would not be a
pronouncement that this or that is or will be treated as being the case. So it is not within
the scope of this article. "Anyone who uses contraceptives shall be considered an
adulterer" would be a normative pronouncement within our scope. "The use of
contraceptives is unnatural" would not be a proposition regarding morality, although it
might be offered in support of such a proposition.
35. William Stringfellow, a great lawyer and theologian, once caused considerable
excitement by saying that the civil rights movement is about baptism. Will D. Campbell,
Brother to a Dragonfly 230 (Continuum, 1977). His point was not to exclude the unbaptized,
but to derive from the theology of the sacrament a call to solidarity transcending the
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The unique epistemic authority of the church goes by the
name of magisterium. This use of the term evidently originated
in the nineteenth century.36 It is coordinate with dominium, the
authority of owners over their property, and imperium, the
authority of rulers over their subjects. I shall try in the rest of this
article to isolate this phenomenon from other manifestations of
ecclesiastical authority and see what it looks like.
In the medieval period, the church's legal structure took on
a form of which it retains a good deal even today. The form was
characterized by a couple of serious confusions among the three
categories of pronouncement we have been considering. In the
first place, the system developed a theoretical sophistication that
greatly outran its capacity for either gathering information or
enforcing its mandates. As a result, it fell into a habit of
articulating what should have been normative dispositions in
constitutive form. 37 Having decided that a priest should not be
the pastor of two parishes, and having no adequate way of finding
out whether the priest showing up to be put in charge of a parish
was already in charge of another (the history of centralized record
keeping is an important one, but this is not the place for it), the
authorities provided that his first position, if any, would become
ipso facto vacant when he was put into the second. Having
decided that a man should not marry the sister of his cast-off
mistress, and having no way of learning of the prior liaison with
the prospective sister-in-law unless the parties admitted it, they
made the marriage ipso facto void if there had been such a
liaison. Provisions of this kind with constitutive effects of which
most people might be quite unaware introduced great swathes of
uncertainty into personal status and the tenure of ecclesiastical
offices without having much effect at all on compliance.
Particularly problematic in this regard was the broad range of
situations in which people could incur excommunication without
anyone (themselves included) knowing that they had done so.
This form of constitutive sanction became so prevalent that one
bishop actually had corpses dug up on the theory that the
level playing field. On reflection, I believe he was right, but I had accepted the same
theology for a long time without arriving at this particular consequence.
36. The earliest reference in the Oxford English Dictionary to the use of the word in
this sense is to the Dublin Rev 422 (April 1866).
37. See Robert E. Rodes Jr., Ecclesiastical Administration in Medieval England 79-84 (U Notre
Dame Press, 1977).
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deceased had incurred excommunication by being buried in the
wrong place.38 Any competent canonist would have said the
bishop was going too far, but the chances of being inadvertently
excommunicated were significant. And the chances of a
clergyman incurring the comparable state of irregularity,
excluding him from the exercise of the ministry, were, according
to one commentator, better than even.39 Until quite recently, the
formula for absolution in the confessional responded to this
situation by including absolution from excommunication and
other censures "to the extent of my power and your need." In
other words, one uncertain constitutive effect was uncertainly
canceled out by another.
I believe this proliferation of constitutive pronouncements
had a significant effect on the development of Catholic doctrine
regarding conscience. Looking at a widespread and severe
sanction with no way of determining who had incurred it, church
people naturally drew on a subjective consideration to fill the
gap. Until the constitutive sanction against you was confirmed by
a normative pronouncement-e.g., a judicial or administrative act
referring to you by name-you were not bound by it unless your
conscience told you that you had done something wrong to incur
it. I think a good deal of learning about the resolution of doubt,
the distinction between the internal and the external forum, and
the primacy of conscience takes its origin from this situation.
Another longstanding confusion arises from the practice of
setting forth epistemic pronouncements in normative form. The
tendency to regard misbelievers as evil rather than as honestly
mistaken is an old one, not without support in the New
Testament: St. Paul's instructions to Timothy and Titus on how to
run their churches do not leave much room for respecting the
good faith of the opposition. Also, with the integration of the
church into the moribund Roman state, bishops and ecclesiastical
synods began adopting the legislative style of the civil authorities,
who became more and more vituperative as they became less and
less in control. Referring to opponents as madmen or monsters
of depravity became no more than customary rhetoric for the
doctrinal pronouncements of the period. Add to this
development the need of the early church to define itself in a
38. Parry, ed, RegistrumJohannis de Tillek, Episcopi Herefordensis 105, 120 (viii Canterbury &
York Soc'y, 1912).
39. Christopher St. Germain, The Addicions of Salem and Byzance fol. 5 (London, 1534).
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welter of religions new and old, and the need of the medieval
church to control its personnel and resources, and it becomes
understandable that authoritative pronouncements on doctrine
have often seemed more concerned with excluding error than
with witnessing truth, and perhaps more concerned with
excluding erring people than with excluding erroneous doctrine.
So it is that the 1918 Code of Canon Law, in force until 1983,
claims for doctrinal pronouncements a normativity considerably
beyond their epistemic scope:
It is not enough to avoid heretical depravity; one must also
diligently flee those errors that more or less lead up to it.
Therefore, all must observe (servare) the constitutions and
decrees by which such depraved opinions are proscribed
and forbidden by the Holy See (can. 1324-my translation).
The 1983 Code avoids the vituperation of the earlier material, but
it is no less normative in form: "All the Christian faithful are
obliged to observe (again, servare) the constitutions and decrees
which the legitimate authority of the Church issues in order to
propose doctrine and proscribe erroneous opinions" (can. 754-
C.L.S.A. translation). The persistence of these normative patterns
means that even today people will tend to see the church's
doctrinal pronouncements less as informing them than as
ordering them about.
Confusion of categories probably does not create any
controversies in the church, but it does structure the way they
will be conducted when they occur. I will not pursue any
particular controversy here, but a few words about some of them
may indicate what I have in mind.
1. Humanae Vitae,40 the papal document condemning the use
of contraceptives, if it is not epistemic, is beyond the
competence of its author. It occupies a realm in which the
church has authority to teach, but not to legislate.
Nevertheless, most accounts of how it came to be adopted
indicate that one of the pope's main concerns was the
common good of the church.4 Much of the criticism of the
40. (Wash, Nat'l Council of Catholic Bishops, 1968).
41. It is generally believed that the pope rested his decision on the considerations set
forth in the minority report of the papal commission on the subject. That report is
published in D. Callahan, ed, The Catholic Case for Contraception 174 (Macmillan, 1969). It
pays a great deal of attention to the impairment of the credibility of the magisterium that
would result if contraception were declared to be morally licit. Prudential arguments
based on this concern-which are non-epistemic-are a little difficult to separate from
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document has addressed the same concern. Common good
is the standard criterion for normative decisions; it has no
place in epistemic judgments.
2. The requirement of celibacy is constitutive for a priest
The Code of Canon Law says "Persons who are in holy
orders invalidly attempt marriage" (can. 1087). There is
discussion in some circles about whether priests are bound
to obey this requirement. But, given its constitutive form,
there is nothing to obey. Unless this canon is repealed or
dispensed from, a priest who goes through a marriage
ceremony is not only disobedient, he is single.
3. Marriage annulments are strictly epistemic. They
determine that the relationship between the parties affected
was in fact not a marriage. But there is a good deal of
literature suggesting that considerations of common good or
individual hardship-normative considerations-enter or
ought to enter into the decisions of the tribunals. 42
4. The question of the orthodoxy of a theologian's teaching
would seem to be primarily epistemic If he teaches that X is
the case, a finding that X is not the case would seem to be a
sine qua non of any proceeding against him for the teaching.
But theologians generally perceive such proceedings as
being from the outset accusations of wrongdoing-that is, of
violating normative standards. And, indeed, those who set
such proceedings in motion seem to give the accused good
reason to regard them in that way.43
5. The serious question regarding the ordination of women
is epistemic: If the rite of ordination is duly performed on a
woman, will she then be a priest? The pope, by saying that
the church is not authorized to ordain women, rather than
that it is not capable of doing so, has at least somewhat
arguments based on the epistemic privilege of the magisterium, but the prudential
arguments certainly play a part. A number of the dissenting arguments in the above
volume reflect similar prudential concerns: It is Huntanae Vitae, ill-reasoned as it is, that
will impair the credibility of the magisterium. Also non-epistemic are arguments based
on the problem of overpopulation. See, for example, Adrian Hastings, The Faces of God 42-
46 (Orbis, 1976). On the other hand, arguments based on the effect of the anti-
contraceptive teaching on the spiritual lives of individuals may be epistemic: moral
principles may be known through experience.
42. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Power to Dissolve (Harv U Press, 1972). The epistemic
question in a marriage case is ontological rather than moral, so the experience of
hardship cannot have the same relevance it has in the case of contraception.
43. See, for example, T.J. Reese, Inside the Vatican 248-63 (Harv U Press, 1996).
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confused the issue.44 His own pronouncement is epistemic,
but the pronouncement he attributes to the Lord is
normative where it might have been constitutive. At any
rate, much of the opposition has been politically structured
in forms that make no sense unless the pronouncement
objected to is normative.
6. The bishop of Lincoln, Nebraska recently proclaimed that
all Catholics who belonged to certain organizations and did
not -quit by a certain day would be automatically
excommunicated on that day. 5 Under the canon law, such a
pronouncement is constitutive: no further action is
necessary to make excommunicates of the people to whom
it applies.46 On the other hand, by long tradition it does not
apply to anyone whose conscience is clear-in this case, to
anyone who believes there is nothing wrong with belonging
to the organizations in question.47 But much of the polemic
aroused by the pronouncement, both pro and con, has
treated it as a normative pronouncement fortified with a
severe punishment.
DISSENT AND OPPOSITION
When the constituted authorities have determined that such
and such is the case, those who continue to insist that it is not the
case, and to act accordingly, are said to "dissent." Consideration
of the place of this kind of dissent in the life of the church relates
necessarily to the epistemic. Dissent from a constitutive
pronouncement would be unavailing. We can approve or
disapprove of such a pronouncement, but if it is within the
authority of its author, it will have its effect whether we approve
or not. For instance, a person who does not like daylight saving
time will generally not adopt a dissenting version of what time it
is. He will admit that it is two o'clock even though he thinks it
should be one.
44. Origins, xxiv 49 (1994): "The church has no authority whatsoever to confer
priestly ordination on women." "The real reason is that ... Christ established things
this way."
45. Origins, 25 xxv (1996).
46. Code of Canon Law, can. 1314.
47. On the traditional attitude, see the story of Sverre, King of Norway, as recounted
in Rosalind Hill, Theory and Practice of Excommunication in Medieval England, 42 History 1 at 5-6
and notes at xlii (1957). The tradition, of course, is a mere application of the broader
principle that an unjust law is not binding in conscience.
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Dissent from a normative pronouncement would be
meaningless. Those who disapproved of General Butler's "woman
of the town" ordinance expressed their approval not by pointing
out that women who insulted Union soldiers were not necessarily
prostitutes-which the general already knew-but by vilifying the
general, and eventually having him removed. Similarly, if
lawmakers wish to adjust the affairs of insolvent banks by means
of a conclusive presumption that any director of such a bank is
aware of the insolvency, a person who thinks a particular director
was not aware of the insolvency of a particular bank will not
express dissent from the conclusive presumption; he will attempt
to change the rule by which the presumption was created. To be
sure, it is possible to claim that a constitutive pronouncement is
beyond the authority of its author, or that a normative
pronouncement is unjust. Either claim would support a denial of
the fact asserted in the pronouncement. But that would not be
the assertion dissented from. The dissent would be from the
implied assertion of authority on the one hand, of justice on the
other. These assertions are not constitutive or normative; they
are epistemic. So, whether dissenting Catholics are marrying
before justices of the peace, receiving Communion without
resigning from Planned Parenthood, or denying the Virgin Birth,
their dissent is from exercises of epistemic authority on the part
of the church.
Dissent from an exercise of epistemic authority will
presumably rest on a claim of the dissenter to be better informed
than the person or persons in whom the authority resides. Going
back to the case of the German submarine that sank the hospital
ship, the commander was justified in believing the German
Admiralty because he had no reason not to. Had he known that
the ship in his periscope was really a hospital ship and not a
troopship in disguise, he would have had both the right and the
duty to disregard his instructions from the Admiralty and allow
the ship to pass.
The medieval writers who teach that Christians must follow
their own consciences even if church authority says the opposite
seem generally to be dealing with marriage cases in which a
person is aware of the true facts but is unable to establish them in
the external forum. Horace is aware that before marrying Wilma
in church he was secretly married to Wanda, who is still living.
But the ecclesiastical judge does not believe his testimony about
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the secret marriage, and orders him to cohabit with Wilma. He
must disobey the judge, because he knows that obedience will be
adultery.48
This of course is an easy case. The epistemic
pronouncement of authority concerns a matter of strict empirical
fact on which the dissenter has first hand information, while all
the information available to the author of the pronouncement is
second hand. In the submarine case, by contrast, the author of
the pronouncement in question-someone in the German
Admiralty-would be likely to have better sources of information
than the commander of the submarine.
But the epistemic pronouncements of authority do not
derive their binding force merely from the trustworthiness of the
sources of information on which they are based. While they
cannot bind anyone who has a solid basis for recognizing that the
asserted fact is not the case, they are not mere opinions or scraps
of evidence to be considered for whatever they may be worth.
For the person subject to them, they are privileged over other
sources of information. Except for infallible pronouncements of
the church, they are not absolute, but they are still not limited to
their intrinsic persuasiveness. For instance, if the German
submarine commander had read in the New York Times that the
British were disguising troopships as hospital ships, his belief
would probably not have won him an acquittal, even though the
Times had better sources of information than the Admiralty, and
less motivation to accept or disseminate falsehood. In fact, the
court treated the commander's defense as one of superior orders,
raising the epistemic privilege of the Admiralty as an answer to
the question whether the commander ought to have known that
the orders were unlawful.
This kind of epistemic privilege extends to belief as well as to
action. Other things being equal, we will probably believe a
determination by the Food and Drug Administration to the effect
that a certain food additive causes cancer more readily than an
article to the same effect in the New England Journal of Medicine, and
we will be readier to believe that someone is a thief or a drug
dealer on the verdict of a jury than on the findings of an
investigative reporter. A legal obligation to believe what we are
48. C. 44, X, v, 39; Aquinas, Sentences IV, dist. 38, art 4. This citation from Aquinas is
given as the authority for the supremacy of conscience over ecclesiastical authority in
Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism 1003 (Winston Press, 1980, Study Ed, 1981).
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told is the case can obviously not carry the same force as one to
do what we are told to do. Still, it is not negligible.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted with this analysis to make three main points
about laws in general that need to be kept in mind in considering
the magisterium of the church. First, not all authoritative
pronouncements to the effect that this or that is the case are
epistemic in form. While some are in fact epistemic, others are
normative or constitutive. This is true of the church as well as of
the state. Second, although the church is more elaborately
concerned with epistemic pronouncements than the state is, it is
not alone in making them. The state and its instrumentalities
often make epistemic pronouncements. Finally, authoritative
epistemic pronouncements, whether coming from the church or
from the state, have what might be called an epistemic privilege.
That is, they command acceptance beyond their intrinsic
persuasiveness or the learning and wit of their authors.
On the other hand, no pronouncement, however
authoritative, carries an epistemic privilege against anyone who is
better informed than its author. It is this principle that makes the
question of the epistemic privilege of the church's doctrinal
pronouncements so exquisitely subtle.
The hippopotamus's day
Is passed in sleep; at night he hunts;
God works in a mysterious way-
The Church can sleep and feed at once.49
It is easy enough to be better informed than this or that bishop or
theologian, but no Christian is better informed about faith or
morals than the corporate reflection of the church under the
guidance of the Holy Spirit. To be sure, not all the doctrinal
pronouncements emerging from this reflection are infallible-as
modern polemicists have not been slow to point out. But insofar
as they are authentic, they have a high epistemic privilege. They
can be qualified or even superseded as the underlying reflection
49. T.S. Eliot, The Hippopotamus in Selected Poems 40 (Faber, 1954).
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continues, and the church continues to experience history in
dialogue with the world. But I do not think they can be replaced
by equally authentic pronouncements of opposite effect.
With these principles in mind, we can venture a few
conclusions about the obligation of the individual Catholic
toward the epistemic pronouncements of church authorities. I
suggest the following:
1. Trying to correct epistemic pronouncements through
political action is inappropriate. The ability to organize
political opposition to a pronouncement is not a sign of
being better informed than the author, and therefore no
amount of political opposition is a reason for changing or
rejecting the pronouncement. To be sure, some
pronouncements are politically motivated. To the extent
that they are, they are inauthentic, and can be attacked on
that ground. Such an attack is not political.
2. I believe it is also inappropriate to affirm the exact
opposite of a concededly authentic pronouncement: "The
official teaching of the church is that X is the case, but in my
opinion, not-X is the case for the following reasons." An
assertion in that form is a claim to be better informed than
the corporate reflection of the church, and therefore, as I
have indicated, is impermissible.
3. It is quite permissible, however, to argue that a certain
pronouncement is not in fact authentic-that it comes not
from the corporate reflection of the church, but from this or
that prelate, theologian, or deliberative body, a source less
well-informed than the person making the argument. Note
that the question whether the pronouncement is true or
false is not strictly relevant to such an argument. It is a
threshold argument, calculated to overcome the epistemic
privilege of the pronouncement and so open the way for a
subsequent argument that it is false.
Note also that an argument of this kind is legal before it is
theological. The actual author of the pronouncement in
question (or any other pronouncement for that matter) is a
natural person, and the question whether the acts or
utterances of a natural person are to be attributed to an
institution is always and everywhere legal. The divine
guidance of the corporate witness of the church does not
make it any less true that the discernment of that corporate
witness depends on legal analysis of the acts of natural
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persons. Even the absolute epistemic privilege that Catholic
doctrine attributes to certain pronouncements of the pope is
derivative from the place of such pronouncements in the
corporate witness of the church: "The Roman pontiff, when
he speaks ex cathedra ... is endowed with that infallibility
with which the Divine Redeemer has willed that His church
... should be equipped."5
The legal analysis of the church's epistemic
pronouncements presents unique subtleties that cannot be
taken up here. But the beginning of wisdom on the subject
is to recognize that it is legal analysis and not something
else.
4. Even if a pronouncement is authentically that of the
church, it is not necessarily fixed for all time in the deposit
of revealed truth. As I have suggested, it can be qualified or
superseded as the church continues to reflect on its
experience of the Gospel. This too is a legal process of great
subtlety that cannot be taken up here. It involves the
emergence of a people's law from its history, and whole
schools of jurisprudence are devoted to it." In the case of
the church it is particularly subtle because the historical
process is guided by the Holy Spirit. 2 But the guidance is
primarily applicable to the process itself, and only
secondarily to the legal pronouncements derived from it.
That derivation is still a matter of legal analysis.
5. Authenticity with its accompanying epistemic privilege is
not a quality that pronouncements either possess fully or do
not possess at all. The authors of such pronouncements
have different positions in the governance of the church,
and are differently anchored in the tradition whose
authenticity is the source of their own. The
pronouncements themselves, therefore, have different
degrees of authenticity, and are open to different
combinations of flat out negation and qualification or
supersession. Finding just the combination to go with any
50. First Vatican Council, 1870. Documents of the Christian Church, Henry Bettenson, ed,
383 (Oxford U Press, 1947).
51. For a judicious treatment of the subject, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Alliance of Law
and History in Persons and Masks of the Law 152-67 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976).
52. Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the founder of the Historical School of Jurisprudence,
thought of law as an emanation of the Volksgeist, the spirit of a people. Using this
terminology, one might say that the Holy Spirit is the Volksgeist of the church.
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given pronouncement is another task that belongs in large
part to legal analysis.
The object of these conclusions, and, indeed, of this whole
article is to stake out a claim for legal analysis in a polemical
context in which it has been sadly lacking. I am not suggesting
that law should replace theology-God forbid! But it is all too
easy to cut our particular theological reflections loose from the
slow and not altogether predictable development of the
corporate experience of the People of God-to let them float in
the air or to attach them to one of the world's ephemeral hitching
posts. It is easy also to make the opposite mistake of clinging to
the institutional church with a mindless authoritarianism that
stultifies any serious participation in its ongoing corporate
reflection, or indeed any theological reflection at all. To avoid
both errors requires knowing how to work creatively within the
framework of a corporate body, and how to work in due but no
more than due subordination to constituted authority. For the
purpose, it requires a more versatile set of legal categories than
have yet been brought to bear on the magisterium. I hope here
to have taken a step or two toward developing such a set.
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